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AN APOLOGY FOR APOLOGETICS
Paul J. Griffiths
Prolegomena
It has become a truism (though none the less true for that) to say that the world has
grown smaller; that the community within which each of us lives is no longer the
church or the nation, but the world; and that Christian theology as an intellectual
discipline cannot legitimately be done without making the realization of these
things central to its practice. 1 Those who say this the loudest are, however, often
the last to offer a serious treatment of the pressing intellectual problems that such a
realization brings. How is systematic theology to be practiced if the tradition-based
norms that have shaped it are placed in (and relativized by) a context ofradical
religious pluralism? What is the status and validity of Christian ethical and metaethical theory in such a context? What, in such a context, can the adjective 'Christian' mean? Is it genuinely possible to engage in constructive theological thought
comparatively?2 These are large questions, to none of which I know the answers.
I certainly don't intend to enter into a systematic treatment of any of them here.
Instead, I'd like to explore, in a fair amount of detail and with as much precision
as I can muster, one small preliminary question: what is the nature and status of
the discipline of inter-religious apologetics?
This may seem an odd question to choose as a prolegomenon to the broader and
more difficult questions mentioned. Apologetics is a term laden with many negative connotations; to be an apologist for the truth of one religious claim or set of
religious claims over against another is, in certain circles, seen as not far short of
being a racist. 3 In almost all mainstream institutions in which theology is taught in
the USA, apologetics as an intellectual discipline does not figure prominently in
the curriculum. You'll look for it in vain in the catalogues of the Divinity Schools
at Harvard or Chicago. Liberal Protestants have never been wedded to the virtues
of apologetics, and, as a broad generalization, the Roman Catholic tradition of
systematic apologetics appears to have been killed by the Second Vatican Council
and especially by Nostra Aetate. Why then choose it? A detailed justification of
the choice is in the paper that follows. As a preliminary defence: it appears to me
that a proper understanding of the status and importance of inter-religious apologetics will be of enormous help in clarifying the significance of theological claims
to truth made in a pluralistic context. And this, in tum, will have significant
implications for the broader systematic questions mentioned.
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Faith and Philosophy
The Necessity of Inter-Religious Apologetics (NOlA)

I wish to defend the thesis that inter-religious apologetics is a necessary component of theology done in a multi-cultural, religiously plural context. And since
this is now the only context within which theology can properly be done, I shall
also be defending the thesis that theology simpliciter needs apologetics. More
formally, the thesis for which I wish to argue is:

For any two religious communities, Rl and Rb any two ordered sets
of sentences, SI and S2' and any time, T: If SI and S2 are doctrines of
R1 and R 2 , and if, at T, representative intellectuals of R1 come to judge
that some members of S2 are incompatible with some members of SI
(or that S2 and S1 in toto are incompatible), then the representative
intellectuals in question should feel obliged to engage in both positive
and negative apologetics vis-a-vis S2'
Let's call this the principle of the necessity of inter-religious apologetics (the NOlA
principle). Its constituent terms need a little explanation. First, by 'ordered set of
sentences' I mean any collection of sentences ordered in such a way that what they
express constitutes a conceptual system in some sphere of discourse, and is recognized as such by its users. The American oath of allegiance would be one such
ordered set; the sphere of discourse in this case would be the individual citizen's
proper relations to the state. The sutras comprising Piil'!ini' s A~!iidhyiiyf would be
another; the sphere of discourse here is that of the rules governing the formation of
semantic items from (notional) roots in the Sanskrit language.
By 'religious community' I mean any group of persons who would, severally
and collectively, acknowledge themselves to be members of some community
which is recognizably religious. Most individuals who would so describe themselves recognize that their membership in any given religious community operates
on a number of levels and that the requirements for entry and continuation are
likely to differ at each level. For example, a Gelukpa Tibetan Buddhist monk
resident in some specific monastery in 1949 would have been likely to identify
himself first as a member of some specific monastic community, then as affiliated
to a particular scholastic lineage, and finally as (most broadly of all) a Buddhist.
It would be possible to specify fairly precisely what it took to become a member
of a specific monastic community in Tibet in 1949, as well as what it took to
remain one; it would be much more difficult to specify the constraints upon
becoming and remaining a Buddhist, in 1949 in Tibet or in any other time and
place. Similar considerations would apply, mutatis mutandis, to the requirements
for entering any specific Christian community and for maintaining oneself as a
member thereof. There will always be difficult marginal instances, and, especially
in the case of multi-cultural, polyglot, semi-fictional entities like 'Buddhism' or
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'Christianity,' some systematic theoretical difficulties in determining who is a
member of which religious community and why. But for the purposes of this
study such nice issues of delineation and demarcation need not be of concern.
The NOlA principle suggests that religious communities (and, by implication,
their members) typically have religious doctrines, and that such doctrines may be
(and are) expressed in ordered sets of sentences. Some traditions have made a virtue
of constructing confessional formulae out of such sets, and have used these formulae
in various ritual settings. Such, for example, is the Nicene creed, recited (or
chanted or sung) in many Christian communities. Such also is the classical twelvefold pratityasamutpiida formula, learned, chanted, and represented iconographically in many Buddhist traditions. The NOlA principle also suggests that it is possible for a sentence that expresses a doctrine of one religious community to be
incompatible with a sentence that expresses a doctrine of another. Such incompatibility may have many forms.4 In the case of sentences that express claims about
the nature ofthe universe or of specific existents within it, it may be strictly logical:
if what is expressed by one sentence is true, what is expressed by the other cannot
be. An example might be the prima facie incompatibility between the Buddhist
assertion everything that exists does so momentarily 5 and the Christian assertion
Jesus Christ is the same, yesterday, today andforever. 6 In the case of sentences
that recommend courses of action, incompatibility may be practical: that it is not
possible for a single individual to consistently follow both courses of action. For
example, there may be an incompatibility of this kind between the (Buddhist)
recommendation of the ceaseless practice of mindfulness (smr:tyupasthiina), and
the (Christian) recommendation that all actions should be done for the greater
glory of God. 7
It should be noted that the NOlA principle requires, in order to come into
operation, only that some representative intellectuals of a given religious community should come to judge that there is an incompatibility of one of the kinds
mentioned, not that there actually is. The phrase 'representative intellectuals' is
inserted in order not to place too great a burden upon the doxastic practices of
ordinary (non-intellectual, non-professional) members of religious communities.
I do not intend to claim that every member of a religious community who finds
herself in the situation described by the NOlA principle is thereby required to
engage in apologetics; only that every religious community should have some
individuals among its members who respond in this way. The NOlA principle
is thus clearly normative in intent, but its normativeness bears upon communities
rather than individuals.
The meaning of 'positive apologetics' and 'negative apologetics' now needs
to be clarified. I understand apologetics in general as an occasional and polemical
intellectual discourse which operates in two quite distinctive modalities. The
first is negative: in this mode, apologetical discourse is designed to show that a
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given critique of (anyone of) the central truth-claims expressed by an ordered
set of doctrine-expressing sentences fails, or that a critique of the set as a whole
(as to, say, its consistence or coherence) does the same. Suppose that someone
from outside the Buddhist tradition presents an argument purporting to show that
two key doctrine-expressing sentences from within the tradition-say, the claim
there are no spiritual substances and the claim each person is reborn many
times-issue in a contradiction if taken together. A Buddhist defender of the
faith will usually try to mend fences by showing that no such contradiction
issues, or that some important misunderstanding of the sentences in question has
occurred. 8 This is negative apologetics in action. Standard-issue Christian
responses to the problem of evil 9 tend to be of the same logical kind.
Positive apologetics is both more complex and more interesting: it is a discourse
designed to show that the ordered set of doctrine-expressing sentences constituting
a particular religious community's doctrines is cognitively superior, in some
important respect(s), to that constituting anotherreligious community's doctrines.
Where negative apologetics is defensive, positive apologetics is offensive; where
negative apologetics mans the barricades, positive apologetics takes the battle
to the enemy's camp.1O Positive apologetics is, by its very nature, part of an
evidentialist program; it often tries to show, by cumulative-case arguments, that
the conceptual system it is attempting to establish is more likely than not (or
more likely than some specific competitor) to be true, both in its parts and as a
whole." It may also (though more rarely) try to provide a knock-down drag-out
argument for the truth of one particular doctrine-expressing sentence, the kind
of argument whose force one cannot preserve sanity and deny. Of this genre are
some versions of the ontological argument.
I have suggested that both kinds of apologetic are (or should be) occasional
and polemical. I mean by this that they are typically occasioned by a specific
challenge of some kind, or by awareness that the ordered set of sentences for
which the apologia is being undertaken is not the only one in the field. This, I
think, is largely the case. But it's also worth noting that, at particular points in
the history of various traditions, there has been a tendency for apologetics to
lose its occasional and polemical thrust and to harden into a formalistic intellectual
discourse, an exercise aimed at showing that a particular set of doctrine-expressing
sentences is cognitively superior to any other, even when the only competitors
actually canvassed are the dry relics of long-dead intellectual systems. This was
certainly often the case in Tibet, where the production of Grub mtha' texts was
an activity of just this kind, 12 and the same is true of many of the Roman Catholic
manuals of apologetics. But this is a degenerate form of apologetics, sufficiently
different in both genre and goals from the kinds of discourse I have in mind to
warrant no further comment.
Apologetics also usually uses only methods of argumentation and criteria of
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knowledge acceptable to the adversary. This to rule out, among other things,
appeals to authority-sources not recognized by one side in the debate. A Buddhist
attempt at positive apologetics vis-a-vis Christianity that does nothing other than
appeal to the word of the Buddha is unlikely to be successful. This restriction
on methods of argumentation and allowable authority-sources is fully consistent
with the character of apologetics as an occasional and polemical intellectual
discipline.
It remains to explain the thrust of the normative 'should' in the NOlA principle.
I take this 'should' to be, first and most interestingly, an epistemic 'should.'
That is, since religious communities characteristically assert the ordered sets of
sentences that express their doctrines because they take them to be true, it is
part of their epistemic duty to consider whether a challenging sentence or set of
such makes it improper to continue asserting what the community asserts. This
will usually initially involve engagement in some form of negative apologeticsan attempt to see whether the competing assertion fails in its claims-but it may
often (and should) pass from there into positive apologetics-the attempt to show
not only that the attack fails, but that the doctrines of the community being
attacked are cognitively superior.
Secondly, the 'should' in the NOlA principle is ethical in a somewhat broader
sense. That is, religious communities often (though not always and not necessarily) hold that assent to sentences expressing the doctrines of the community is
of some considerable soteriological significance. Perhaps the strongest imaginable
soteriological significance that assent to some set of sentences could have is that
of necessary and sufficient conditionality. Here, the relevant assent would both
be necessary for the attainment of salvation (if you don't make it you don't get
it), and sufficient for that attainment (if you do make it you'll certainly get it).
Very few religious communities (perhaps none) suggest that this relationship
holds, and for very good reasons. Among them is the obvious fact that, if assent
to any set of sentences could by itself guarantee salvation, then non-cognitive
attitudes, including praxis of all kinds, would become religiously irrelevant. This
is not a position that any religious community happily takes, and it scarcely
warrants further consideration for the purposes of this study.
A less strong position, though still one that gives much weight to assent to
sets of sentences, is that which judges the relevant relation to be one of necessary
conditionality. This, I think (pace some of the counter-positions to be discussed),
has been and remains very common in virtually all religious communities. The
(pseudo)-Athanasian Creed will serve as an excellent example: both in its surface
logical structure (quicunque vult . .. ) and (probably) in the intent of its framers,
it strongly presents the position that assent to a lengthy and comparatively welldefined set of sentences is a necessary condition for the attainment of salvation.
A weaker position still is that which suggests simply that there is some kind
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of strong positive link between assenting to some set of doctrine-expressing
sentences and attaining salvation. Perhaps that the former is helpful for the latter,
or that it is more helpful than any of its known competitors. This position, too,
is widely instanced in all religious traditions. For theistic traditions it preserves
both the importance of assent to the correct sentences and the possibility of
salvation being attained through such things as unmerited grace in default of
access to the correct set of doctrine-expressing sentences.
However exactly the relation between assent to some set of doctrine-expressing
sentences and the attainment of salvation is conceived, it is beyond doubt that
virtually all religious communities assert that there is some such relation. Many
of them also (including virtually all Christian and Buddhist ones) tend to hold
that the salvation of non-members (those who, inter alia, do not assent to the
sentences in question) is important. The conclusion that there is thus an ethical
imperative placed upon such communities to engage in positive apologetics is
therefore at least suggested.
The key terms used in the NOlA principle should now be clearer. It is not, I
take it, an uncontroversial principle, nor without pressing intellectual difficulties
of its own. Many of its assumptions would be rejected out of hand, for a wide
variety of reasons, by influential voices in today' s academic theological universe,
not least by those concerned with inter-religious questions. And so I shall now
explore what I take to be some of the more important theoretical objections to
the NOlA principle.
Challenges to the NOlA Principle

There are a number of ways in which the NOlA principle can be challenged.
They fall into three main groups. The first is unwilling to concede any of the
significant theoretical assumptions of the principle, the second concedes some
of these assumptions but argues that the situation envisaged by the principle
rarely or never obtains; the third concedes both the assumptions and the situation,
but rejects the conclusion. I shall take an example of each group in the comments
that follow, but first it is necessary to say more about the assumptions at issue.
Underlying the NOlA principle is the assumption that religious communities
characteristically do require assent to doctrine-expressing sentences in the sense
outlined, and that such communities often do consider such assent to be of
soteriological significance. Underlying it also is the assumption that there are
such entities as incompatible doctrine-expressing sentences. Both these assumptions can be challenged on a variety of grounds. It might be argued, for example,
that as a matter of fact religious belief and practice has very little to do with
assent to sets of doctrine-expressing sentences, and that the view that such assent
has any soteriological significance is a characteristic of the (religiously degener-
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ate) post-enlightenment West. 13 With this view often goes a location of the
essence of religiosity in feeling-states, attitudes, or even ethical praxis. If a
position of this kind could be shown, per impossibile, to be convincing, it would
not entail the falsity of the NOlA principle: it would merely show it to be
irrelevant. Some brief comments on this view will be offered below, but I shall
not treat it extensively for reasons that will become clear.
A more thoroughgoing objection to the assumptions mentioned is that not only
is it not the case that (empirically) religious communities engage in the activities
envisaged by the NOlA principle, but that there can (theoretically) be no such
entities as sets of doctrine-expressing sentences capable of standing in opposition
one to another, and that, propter hoc, the NOlA principle has no purchase
because the situation which it envisages can never arise. Theological deconstructionists would presumably fall into this camp. Even on this view, though, the
NOlA principle is not false: it is simply a conditional whose antecedent never
obtains because some of its key terms have no referent. I shall not explore this
extreme position further here, though I shall pay a good deal of attention to a
somewhat similar (though much more interesting and sophisticated) model of
what religious doctrines are and what believing in them means: I refer to that
developed by George A. Lindbeck in The Nature of Doctrine. 14 Lindbeck's model
also rejects the key empirical assumptions upon which the NOlA principle is
based, and does so for theoretical reasons; it attacks the principle at the same
level of theoretical significance by apparently rejecting the idea that there can
be incompatible doctrine-expressing sentences through a denial that such sentences can directly make claims to truth.
A second group of objections to the NOlA principle concedes the theoretical
assumption as to the nature of doctrine-expressing sentences and the possibility
of their conflict, concedes also the empirical assumption that religious communities characteristically do require assent to such things, but denies that as a
matter of fact such conceptual systems ever come into significant conflict, or
that, if they do, we have the cognitive equipment to know that they do. There
is a broad range of positions here. Among them is that of souls sensitive to the
difficult hermeneutical questions involved in understanding even one set of doctrine-expressing sentences, and thus skeptical of the possibility of understanding
more than one well enough to be sure that significant contradictions among them
(or any of their members) do in fact obtain. Cautions of this kind, whether from
philosophers or historians, are important and should be carefully considered; but
they do not (or do not usually) call the NOlA principle as a whole into question.
They merely stress the great difficulty of knowing when it obtains and thus when
it would be appropriate to apply it.
A more thoroughgoing set of objections to the NOlA principle (one that still
falls into this second group), is what I shall call a priori pluralism. This is a
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doctrine that denies the possibility of significant contradiction among doctrineexpressing sentences because of the application to all of them of some equivalence
principle. 15 This may be a principle asserting that all sets of doctrine-expressing
sentences (or at least all those belonging to the world's major religious communities) are (equally) descriptive of the same religious reality; or that they are
all equally effective in transforming human beings; or some such. Below I shall
consider one currently influential variant on this position: that of John Hick.
While lacking either the theoretical interest or the intellectual sophistication of
Lindbeck's model, a priori pluralism is a very widely held (usually viscerally
held) theological position; if true, it makes the NOlA principle inapplicable, and
thus deserves some consideration.
A third and final cluster of objections to the NOlA principle allows almost
all of its claims and assumptions, and centers attention instead upon the normative
'should' in the principle. Typical is the Calvinist objection to natural theology
in all its forms, an objection especially prominent, for example, in the works of
Alvin Plantinga and his followers. The point here is that, while it is agreed that
religious communities characteristically do require assent to sets of doctrineexpressing sentences and that such sets may and do conflict significantly, it is
nevertheless inappropriate to suggest that positive apologetics is ever the proper
response to this situation (although negative apologetics may be recommended).
This for three reasons: that the standards for successful positive apologetics are
impossibly high; that the believer is not violating any duties, epistemic or ethical,
by refusing to engage in it; and that engaging in it suggests an idolatrous attitude
towards human reason and its capacities. This (set of) objections to the NOlA
principle is also currently very influential; I shall have no space to explore it
further here, though I hope to do so in another study in the near future.
I shall now try to show that two of the most pressing critiques of the NOlA
principle in fact provide no decisive reasons for rejecting it. And in conclusion
I shall say more about the importance of the NOlA principle for the Christian
theological enterprise as it should be practiced in the current situation of radical
religious pluralism.
George Lindbeck's Rule-Theory of Religious Doctrine

Lindbeck's agenda in The Nature of Doctrine is, positively, the development
of a cultural-linguistic model of what religious doctrines are, a model which
stresses their regulative functions. Negatively, he is concerned to reject two other
important models: the cognitive-propositional model and the experiential-expressivist model. The former sees doctrines as propositions, bearers of truth-value
and conveyors of information about extra-mental and extra-linguistic realities, 16
while the latter sees them as " ... non informative and nondiscursive symbols
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of inner feelings, attitudes, or existential orientations. ."17 In rejecting the
cognitive-propositional model of religious doctrines Lindbeck seems to call the
NOlA principle into question: for if doctrine-expressing sentences cannot make
direct claims to tmth but can function only regulatively within the bounds of
specific communities, then they cannot be directly incompatible. Since this is
the main significance of Lindbeck's position for the purposes of this paper, I
shall focus most of my attention in the remarks that follow upon what he has to
say about the cognitive-propositional view. But some brief remarks upon why
he takes experiential-expressivism to be an inadequate interpretation of the nature
of doctrine are also in order.
Lindbeck suggests that experiential expressivists typically take doctrine-expressing sentences!8 to express core religious experiences. The relation between
religious experience and religious doctrine on this view is one-way: the former
produces the latter. As Lindbeck correctly points out, this view flies in the face
of all that we know from historical and anthropological studies of the complex
phenomenon of becoming and remaining a member of a religious community.
These studies show, I think decisively, that there is an exceedingly complex
symbiotic and reciprocal relationship between experience and doctrine; each
conditions the other, but if there is a dominant direction of influence it is from
doctrine to experience, not vice-versa. Assent to a given set of doctrine-expressing
sentences (together, of course, with the legends, myths, rituals, practices, and
so forth that accompany it) makes possible the occurrence of certain kinds of
experience, and may at times act as both necessary and sufficient condition for
the occurrence of that experience.!9 Religion, on the cultural-linguistic view, is
thus like a language, an idiom,20 and becoming religious is "to interiorize a set
of skills by practice and training."2! Lindbeck is entirely correct that the weight
of contemporary developmental psychology (Piaget and after), much of contemporary philosophy (especially since Wittgenstein's critique of the possibility of
a private language), almost all current anthropological theory (Clifford Geertz
et at.), and much oflinguistics and cognitive science,22 is in support of a culturallinguistic model and against an experiential-expressivist one. Theologians and
historians of religion (especially those of the Chicago school) are perhaps among
the last important intellectual groups for whom the insights of these disciplines
have still to be absorbed. They have not yet been able to exorcise Schleiermacher's
ghost.
Lindbeck's rejection of experiential-expressivism is, then, to be applauded.
But, as he realizes, the rejection of experiential-expressivism and its replacement
by some form of cultural-linguistic theory does not by itself entail (or even
suggest) the rejection of a propositional theory of what (at least some) doctrineexpressing sentences are. 23 It may still be the case that some doctrine-expressing
sentences represent propositions and bear truth-value. And at this point we come
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to the question of truth, a question that Lindbeck raises explicitly in his third
chapter. Here he distinguishes two kinds of truth" corresponding to the two
views of religious doctrine that he considers to be serious options: the cognitivepropositional and the cultural-linguistic. On the first view, to say of a religious
doctrine that it is true is to say that the natural-language sentence which expresses
it corresponds to reality. So, for example, when a Buddhist says everything that
exists is momentary, the proposition thus expressed is true if and only if everything
that exists is momentary. On the second (cultural-linguistic) view of religious
doctrines truth is a property not of propositions but of the categories of systems:
a religious conceptual system is true if and only if the categories that constitute
it make reference to "whatever is in fact more important than anything else in
the universe"25 a possibility. That is, if by using these categories one can talk
about whatever the object of religious discourse is taken to be, then the system
by which they are constituted is categorially true. On this view, it would seem,
one would have to interpret the Buddhist assertion just mentioned as a categorial
assertion, an assertion that a given category (and only that category) should be
employed in order to make meaningful reference to religious reality. It should
be understood, that is, as a rule whose content can be paraphrased, roughly, as
it is incumbent upon the Buddhist religious community to use the category of
momentariness in talking about reality.
Now, if this is Lindbeck's view, his stress on the importance of seeing religious
doctrines as idioms, as cultural-linguistic systems that generate categories and
provide rules for which category is to be used when, does not make it impossible
that some doctrine-expressing sentences may also make claims to the kind of
truth possessed by (what Lindbeck calls) first-order propositions, and may thus
oppose one another as the NOlA principle suggests. More broadly, Lindbeck's
position is both defensible and illuminating if all he wants to claim is that some
(perhaps even many) doctrine-expressing sentences function for religious communities primarily as rules. But further arguments are needed if the stronger
thesis that all doctrine-expressing sentences function only regulatively for all
religious communities is to hold.
At times, Lindbeck does seem to want to go just this far. He says, for example,
that the regulative, the marking-out of proper categories for the use of the
community, is the only job that church doctrines do. 26 In order to see exactly
what is at issue here something needs to be said about Lindbeck's technical
'Excursus on Religion and Truth. '27 He begins here by making a distinction
between intrasystematic truth and ontological truth. The former is the truth that
given utterances have in virtue of their coherence "with the total relevant context."28 A religious utterance is thus intrasystematically true if and only if it
coheres with all other utterances, attitudes and practices in the religious form of
life within which it occurs. By contrast, an utterance is ontologically true if and
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only if it corresponds to extra-categorial reality. Lindbeck then claims that, for
any given religious utterance, intrasystematic truth is a necessary condition for
ontological truth. He uses the striking example of a crusader uttering the sentence
christus est dominus while lopping off the head of an infidel, and claims that
the intrasystematic incoherence of the utterance with the action makes the former
false. 29 Conversely, the utterance may be true if spoken in a situation wherein
it coheres with the total context. This elevation of intrasystematic truth to the
status of a necessary condition for ontological truth is, on the face of it, odd.
Certainly, if applied to other forms of discourse it leads to manifest absurdities;30
it would seem preferable to say not that the crusader's utterance is false, but
that it fails as a religious utterance. 31 I suspect, however, that Lindbeck's reasons
for making this apparently implausible claim about the logical relations between
intrasystematic and ontological truth have to do with his view that a religious
utterance can have ontological truth (that is, a correspondence between what is
expressed in the utterance and reality) "only insofar as it is a performance, an
act or deed which helps create that correspondence. "32 It's significant that
Lindbeck uses the term 'utterance' throughout the 'Excursus': he does so because
he wishes to assert that sentences forming part of religious conceptual systems
can possess ontological truth only when uttered in an appropriately faith-centred
confessional setting. 33 This, he says, is because only in such settings can "religious
utterances" gain sufficient referential specificity to be capable of expressing
propositions and thus of possessing ontological truth. A corollary of this view
is the position (worked out at length in chapters 4-5) that confessional language
is first-order discourse while the language of technical theology is second-order
discourse. The former (and only the former) is capable of expressing propositions,
while the latter provides and organizes the categories (the grammar and syntax)
that govern which assertions may be made. Church doctrine (technical theology)
thus becomes entirely regulative in function, while truth-claims are made only
in and through confessional utterance.
It seems worth pursuing some of the implications of this view. To restate the
position formally: a religious utterance becomes a true first-order proposition for
Lindbeck if and only if all of the following four conditions are met: (i) That the
utterance in question is spoken in a context wherein it is intrasystematically true;
(ii) That the utterance in question is part of a conceptual system which is categorially
true; (iii) That the utterance in question is given voice to in an appropriate confessional context; and (iv) That reality is as the utterance in question says it is. All of
these conditions except the third can be met by the doctrine-expressing sentences
found in technical theological texts.
Why then, in Lindbeck's view, is this third condition so necessary? He offers
two reasons, one (in the 'Excursus') explicit but confused; the other, somewhat
more compelling, implicit throughout the book and coming to the surface in the

410

Faith and Philosophy

final chapter. 34 To take the first reason first: Lindbeck argues (as already mentioned) that a necessary condition for the possession of ontological truth by any
given religious utterance is that the utterance in question be performative. By
this, following J. L. Austin,35 he means that a religious utterance must, in order
to be ontologically truthful, create a new reality. Suppose the Nicene Creed is
recited by a believer in an appropriate liturgical setting: this act may certainly
be regarded in Austinian terms as an instance of uttering performatively. It may
be understood as constituting a new relationship between two previously-existing
relata: the worshiper and God. In this it fits the structure of Austin's more homely
examples (apologies, marriage vows, etc.). But it cannot be understood as constituting or bringing into existence either of the two relata to whom its utterance
relates. God exists (if God does) before the utterance, with all of God's essential
properties (if God has any), just as God does after the utterance. So does the
worshiper. What is changed (newly constituted) is the relation between them.
But if this is all that is meant by categorizing religious utterance as performative,
not enough has been said to support Lindbeck's third requirement for the possession of ontological truth by a religious utterance-that such an utterance be given
voice to in an appropriate confessional context. This is so because among the
conditions for the efficacy of every performative religious utterance is the truth
of some more-or-Iess specifiable non-performative doctrine-expressing sentences.
In the case under consideration these would include there is a God who made
heaven and earth and there is an utterer of religious utterances who is other
than God-and so forth.
To generalize: in order for any performative utterance (religious or otherwise)
to function as such, what is expressed by some set of non-performative utterances
must be ontologically true. To suggest, as Lindbeck does, that only sentences
uttered confessionally and with performative function can possess ontological
truth is thus confused.
Lindbeck's use of Austin's category is therefore quite insufficient for the task
he wishes it to perform. It suggests, in fact, not that confessional utterance
possesses ontological truth because of its performativity, but rather that (following
Austin) ontological truth is never a property of performative utterance,36 and,
propter hoc, never a property of performative confessional utterance. None of
this, of course, is to say that performative utterance is uninteresting or religiously
insignificant; only that it can't, by its very nature, possess ontological truth in
Lindbeck's sense.
Lindbeck does offer (or at least suggest) another set of reasons for the necessity
of his third condition on a given religious utterance possessing ontological truth.
This, if I correctly understand his remarks on intratextuality and skill37 and his
references to the work of Hans Frei on the importance of narrative,3S is that only
by fully entering into the lebensform that constitutes a p·articular religious com-
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munity can one understand the doctrine-expressing sentences of that community
with sufficient richness and precision to be able to utter them with enough
referential specificity to give them the possibility of possessing ontological truth.
Further, the key terms of the doctrine-expressing sentences in question are given
their content largely in and through the use of narratives (hence the significance
of Hans Frei's work).'9 How can one know Buddha without knowing the Jiitaka
stories? How can one know God without knowing that "vast, loosely-structured,
non-fictional novel"40 that Christians call the Bible? Theologizing, claims
Lindbeck, must thus be done "intratextually," in the sense that what normatively
constrains it is an agreed text. Briefly, and perhaps more crudely than Lindbeck
would like, members of religious communities need their stories in order to tell
them to whom (or to what) their religious utterances refer.
It's hard to disagree with this. But it's equally hard to see that it's terribly
significant. That exposure to and faith in certain stories is a necessary condition
for understanding (and even for properly making) religious utterances is surely
an important psychological truth for most members of most religious communities; but it is equally obviously not a logical truth. If it were the latter, then
I, as a member of a Christian community, could neither fully understand nor
properly assert (or deny) any Buddhist doctrine-expressing sentences. And the
result would be both relativism and fideism: religious communities as closed,
impermeable, incommensurable forms of life.
Lindbeck recognizes this, and recognizes it as a problem. 4 ! He wishes to
preserve his cultural-linguistic view of doctrine-expressing sentences as purely
regulative in function (when used non-confessionally), and as not fully comprehensible to the outsider, and yet still allow both the possibility of and (at
times) the necessity for an "ad hoc apologetic"42 directed towards outsiders. His
model for how such an ad hoc apologetic might function is catechetical: the
non-member can only be made a member by a full process of acculturationcatechesis in a rich sense, including exposure to the relevant narratives, practices
and so forth. Ad hoc apologetics, for Lindbeck, offers a form of life; it is
successful if and only if the recipient of the offer enters the form of life. Lindbeck
further thinks that the significance of rational argumentation in all of this (of
apologetics as envisaged by the NOlA principle) is vanishingly small. 43
Two points need to be made. First, even if Lindbeck is correct in all of his
contentions about the practical importance of narrative, intratextuality, and
catechesis for both the enterprise of fully understanding religious utterances and
the enterprise of creating new members of religious communities, he offers no
new arguments here for their logical necessity. Nothing in his final chapter
suggests that a given doctrine-expressing sentence cannot possess ontological
truth (or be fully comprehended) outside the (almost) closed, intratextually constituted, circle of a particular religious lebensform. Much of it suggests that such
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sentences are very often not fully understood outside the circle, but that is a
very different matter from claiming that they cannot be. Secondly, it's very
revealing that the person at whom Lindbeck's intratextual, catechetical apologetic
is aimed is never the intellectually sophisticated passionately committed member
of another religious community. 44 Rather, it's the dechristianized postliberal
secular individual. The catechetical model of apologetics is most intuitively
appropriate in such cases because it can be seen as filling a void, a need. It loses
almost all of its force when placed into the inter-religious context under consideration here. Lindbeck's discussion-partner is still the non-believer, not the
other-believer.
In conclusion: Lindbeck's rejection of experiential-expressivism is entirely
justified. His use of cultural-linguistic models of religion is also very fruitful,
both for our understanding of how religious doctrine (often) functions in communities and in the life of the believer, and for our understanding of how one
becomes and remains a member of a religious community. But Lindbeck's
espousal of cultural-linguistic models does not require (or even suggest) that
only confessional religious utterances can be ontologically true, or that all doctrinal formulations are regulative. The doctrine-expressing sentences of an averagely sophisticated religious community can still (and should still) be seen as
capable of bearing truth. This in no way hinders their ability to function as rules.
Taking this view also leaves open the possibility of interesting empirical enquiries
into the question of how specific doctrine-expressing sentences do in fact function
for specific religious communities. I suspect, contra Lindbeck, that there is no
useful a priori answer to this question; it is likely that some doctrine-expressing
sentences function both regulatively and propositionally for some religious communities, some only regulatively, and some only propositionally. Those parts,
then, of Lindbeck's rule-theory that can be defended do not require the rejection
of inter-religious apologetics, positive or negative; the NOlA principle thus
stands.

A Priori Pluralism
Perhaps the most vocal and visible proponent of this view in recent years has
been the British theologian John Hick. 45 While not notable for the rigor with
which it is stated and argued for, and thus rather difficult to give a precise
delineation of, the view may be characterized roughly as follows: (i) That the
central doctrine-expressing sentences of all major religious communities have as
their ultimate referent the same ultimately significant religious reality; (ii) That
these doctrine-expressing sentences operate within the context of a religious
life-world (a "religious totality" as Hick often puts it) as aids in the transformation
of the believer: they, together with their associated practices, myths, stories,
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institutions, and so forth, mediate religious reality to human beings and thus
transform their lives; (iii) That all the major world religions-and thus also all
the sets of doctrine-expressing sentences espoused by those religions-are equally
effective in mediating religious reality and in transforming for the better the lives
of those who adhere to them.
These views apply an equivalence-principle to all doctrine-expressing sentences. 46 They require that there actually is a single religiously ultimate reality,
and that it is of a kind capable of effective mediation through a wide variety of
incompatible sentences. It means, to take an example from Buddhism and Christianity, that ultimate reality must be such that it can be characterized both as a
set of evanescent instantaneous events connected to one another by specifiable
causes but without any substantial independent existence, and as an eternal
changeless divine personal substance. While it may not be impossible to construct
some picture of ultimate reality which meets these demands, it is far from easy
to see how it might be done. The a priori nature of the position is evident from
the fact that no empirical evidence as to the extent of incompatibilities among
doctrine-expressing sentences is allowed to count against its truth.
What one usually finds in the writings of pluralistic thinkers on the question
of how it is that the same ultimate reality can be characterized in apparently
contradictory ways is a bow in the direction of ineffability-since the ultimate
reality transcends all our characterizations of it, we have to make a fundamental
distinction between it as it is an sich and it as it is apprehended by US. 47 While
it may indeed be the case that ultimate reality is, in and of itself, just the kind
of thing that can be characterized and mediated in the ways suggested above,
the prior probability of this being true seems distressingly low; some powerful
collateral reasons to support it are needed.
Hick does offer some collateral reasons. First, he gives an ex post Jacto
justification of (irs possibility which assumes its truth. This usually has the
following form: if there really is a single transcendent reality one would expect
human characterizations and descriptions of it to differ, perhaps even, allowing
for the radical effects of contingent social and cultural factors upon such conceptualization and description, to differ drastically. So the fact that we do find such
drastically differing descriptions of the putative ultimate reality is not troubling.
Then there are a couple of reasons given for (irs desirability. The first of
these has to do with world harmony: if everyone becomes convinced of the truth
of (i) then missionaries will pack their bags, Jews, Muslims, and Christians will
stop fighting one another in the Middle East, Buddhists and Hindus will stop
fighting one another in Sri Lanka, and the world will become a much happier
and more habitable place. There is also the suggestion that the sincere and
committed believer of any particular religious community often meets sincere
and convinced believers of other communities in whom, as Hick puts it, "the
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fruits of openness to the divine Reality are gloriously apparent."4'
None of these collateral reasons is able to do the work it needs to do. While
it is probably true that much of the violence and bloodshed in the world has
something to do with religious hatred, broadly understood, this is not by itself
a sufficient reason to deny that instances of such disagreement are cognitively
significant. And the recognition that there are good, sincere and apparently
grace-filled individuals in all religious communities does not in any way require
that there be no substantive cognitive conflicts among the truth-claims of those
traditions.
There are other, and perhaps more severe, problems with a priori pluralism
as I have defined it. I shall note only two. First, there is the problem of criteria
for exclusion. The thrust of the position is to remove the need for excluding as
false or inadequate any doctrine-expressing sentence of significance to any community. And yet this leads rather rapidly to very undesirable conclusions. Consider, for example, the case of the Jonestown massacre: the reverend Jim Jones
built up a devoted following in California in the 1970s, and then led the faithful
off to await the coming of the kingdom in Guiana. While there the community
appears to have degenerated into paranoia and fear, and ended with the founder
instructing his followers to drink cyanide. Some complied willingly; others were
forced. The end result was the agonizing death of hundreds. What does the a
priori pluralist say about such a case? She would presumably want to exclude
a sentence of the form God is such that God wants God's followers to drink
cyanide now as being properly descriptive of the ultimate reality; presumably,
also, this sentence is not to be regarded as on a par with God was in Christ
reconciling the world to himself as a means of mediating the ultimate reality to
human beings and transforming the quality of their lives. And yet in order to
make such nice distinctions the a priori pluralist must construct criteria for
separating appropriate affirmations about the ultimate reality from inappropriate
ones. He must, in other words, enter into apologetical discourse whether he likes
it or not.
There are some signs in Hick's recent work that he is prepared to countenance
the suggestion that some doctrine-expressing sentences must be rejected, as must
some religious forms of life. But his suggestions as to criteria by which this may
be done are thin. Some religious communities, apparently, constitute an effective
context of transformation, while others do not. But we are never told how to
distinguish the former from the latter, nor what arguments may be brought to
bear in support of the distinctions we must make. Hick's lack of interest in this
matter comes directly from the inner logic of his position: his a priori pluralism
was constructed in an attempt to get away from the need to make such invidious
distinctions. To attempt a rational justification of the distinctions that even a
pluralist like Hick must make would be to re-enter the apologetical arena, and
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since doing this is abhorrent to him, the distinctions are made but not argued for.
To take one example: Hick's position would seem to entail, if taken seriously,
that any religious community which claims cognitive superiority for its set of
doctrine-expressing sentences over that of another religious tradition must be
making a false claim. Yet to assert this is precisely to claim that some of the
doctrine-expressing sentences of some religious communities are false; and such
an interesting and potentially religiously divisive assertion cries out for justification through argument, justification which Hick seems not to want to provide.
It is, perhaps, worth offering a comment on the likely reasons for the current
popularity of theological perspectives that fit under the pluralist umbrella. 49 It is
a characteristically Western postwar perspective. It is almost impossible to find
hardline a priori pluralists in either the Buddhist or Christian tradition in any
other place or time. It is probably that the major historical reason for the emergence
of this current of thought in our time is a profound (and justified) postcolonialist
guilt on the part of sensitive Western Christian intellectuals. Some atrocities
have been committed in the name of the Christian faith; others with the silent
connivance of Christians. We know it and want to distance ourselves from it,
to ensure that it doesn't happen again. Adoption of the pluralist perspective
seems a way of ensuring at least that Western colonialist aggression doesn't get
out of hand and become too intimately linked (as it often has been in the past)
with Christian theology. These goals are admirable, but there are other and better
ways to atone for our reprehensible past than the adoption of incoherent philosophical positions in the present.
A priori pluralism would, if true, seriously threaten the NOlA principle. It
would make significant clash among the doctrine-expressing sentences of different
religious communities effectively impossible, and would thus make the apologetical response (positive or negative) completely inappropriate. But, as I have tried
to show, a priori pluralism is, prima facie, a massively implausible position,
and the collateral arguments offered for its truth do not go far enough towards
remedying this implausibility. The NOlA principle thus stands.
Conclusions
My conclusions will be brief. I have tried to show that the NOlA principle
can stand against some of the major criticisms which are usually brought against
it. Even if I have been successful in this, I have not, of course, shown that the
principle is true. It remains to say something about the principle's significance
for contemporary Christian theological thinking about non-Christian traditions. 50
I take it to have important, though limited, applications. It comes into operation
only when the situation described by the principle obtains, and there is, as I've
suggested, much careful historical work to be done before one can be sure, in
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a given case, that the situation does obtain. But when the necessary careful
historical and hermeneutical work has been done, when representative intellectuals of a particular religious community arrive at the conclusion that there is
indeed a prima facie case of incompatibility, the NOlA principle should be
applied.
Recognition of the principle, together with its application where appropriate,
is, however, not exhaustively descriptive of the Christian theological task in a
religiously pluralistic world. It is, rather, a relatively minor part of this task,
and it in no sense precludes or excludes the constructive enterprise of comparative
theology. The NOlA principle simply represents one modality under which
theological thinking in a religiously plural context must operate if it is to stay
honest. It is also a modality which brings with it some great practical benefits:
it is one of the most useful ways available to a theologian of learning about the
internal intellectual dynamics of a tradition other than her own. Intellectual
challenge and the response it brings is almost always more productive of understanding and knowledge than the pallid, platitudinous, degutted discourse in
which so much contemporary inter-religious 'dialogue' consists. So there are
pragmatic as well as purely theoretical reasons for a proper recognition and
application of the NOlA principle.
There is also, given the regnant intellectual orthodoxies among academic
theologians on the question of how theology should be done in a religiously
plural context (some of them discussed in this paper), a real need for an apologia
for apologetics. It is this need that this paper has tried to fill. But the task of
developing a responsible apologetic, both positive and negative, is one that has
scarcely yet been begun in any religious community. The primary desiderata for
its future development are: first, the acquisition of more, and more accurate,
knowledge by the intellectual representatives of all religious communities concerning the doctrine-expressing sentences of other communities. In meeting this
need historians ofreligion, area-studies specialists, philologists, religious studies
experts, and so forth, all have a very important part to play. Second, there is a
need for the development of appropriately sophisticated theoretical frameworks
for the comparative analysis of complex conceptual systems, such as those set
forth in the sets of doctrine-expressing sentences belonging to the world's major
religious traditions. There is much to be learned here from theoretical developments in the philosophy of science ,51 and there are some suggestive contributions
by a few philosophers of religion. 52 But there are very few attempts to apply
these theoretical contributions to instances of the kind envisaged by the NOlA
principle.
University of Notre Dame
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NOTES
An early version of this paper was presented at a Theology Department colloquium at the University
of Notre Dame on 9 November 1987. I am grateful for the vigorous discussion it received then, and
am especially indebted to David Burrell, Joseph Wawrykow, Laura Garcia, Robert Krieg, and James
T. Burtchaell for their comments, criticisms, and encouragement. Since that time the paper has
benefited from comments by William Alston, Alvin Plantinga, and John Hick. None of these
individuals, of course, should be held accountable in any way for the opinions expressed herein.
\. For a trenchant expression of this point from a Roman Catholic perspective see Karl Rahner,
"Towards a Fundamental Theological Interpretation of Vatican II," Theological Studies 40 (1979),
pp.716-27.
2. Substantive attempts are being made at this latter task. See, for example, David Burrell, Knowing
the Unknowable God: Ibn-Sina, Maimonides, Aquinas (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1986). I have written on this myself. See F. X. Clooney, P. J. Griffiths, C. Hallisey, J.
Laine, "Catholic Theology and the Study of Religion in South Asia," Theological Studies 48 (1987),
pp. 677-710, esp. pp. 687-96.
3. For a discussion revealing much of the odium theologicum sometimes attached to apologetics
in action see the exchange between Professor Gunapala Dharmasiri (of the Department of Philosophy,
Peradeniya University, Sri Lanka) and myself (forthcoming in The Journal of the International
Association of Buddhist Studies in 1988) on the nature and validity of Theravada Buddhist meta-ethical
theory.
4. For the best available discussions of whether and in what sense one religious doctrine may be
said to oppose or be incompatible with another, see William A. Christian's works: Oppositions of
Religious Doctrines (London & New York: Macmillan, 1972), and Doctrines of Religious Communities (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987). The latter was given a review symposium in
The Thomist in April 1988 (see especially pp. 319-327), in which its importance for the theme of
this paper was drawn out.
5. Taken from Ratnakirti's K~a,!abhaizgasiddhi, edited and translated by A. C. Senape McDermott,
An Eleventh Century Buddhist Logic of 'Exists' (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1970), p. 14.
6. The Epistle to the Hebrews 13:8.
7. For some discussion of this second example see William Christian, Oppositions of Religious
Doctrines, pp. 43-59; Doctrines of Religious Communities, pp. 126-44. I am not claiming either of
the examples used as a clear case of incompatibility; I use them only for illustrative purposes.
8. For a discussion of this kind see my
Religious Studies 18 (1982), pp. 277-91;
19 (1983), pp. 223-28; Paul J. Griffiths,
White," Religious Studies 20 (1984), pp.

"Notes Towards a Critique of Buddhist Karmic Theory,"
J. C. White "Is Karmic Theory False?" Religious Studies
"Karma and Personal Identity" "A Response to Professor
481-85.

9. For example, Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom and Evil (New York: Harper & Row, 1974); "The
Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism," American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (1979);
"The Probabilistic Argument from Evil" Philosophical Studies (1979), pp. 6- 10. Buddhists tend
to respond similarly to attacks from theists. See, classically, Ratnakirti' s lsvarasadhanadii~ana, in Anantalal Thakur, ed., Ratnakfrtinibandhavalih (Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1975), pp.
32-56.
10. For a splendid dialogical exploration of the differences between positive and negative apologetics
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see Gary Gutting, "The Catholic and the Calvinist: A Dialogue on Faith and Reason," Faith and
Philosophy 2 (1985), pp. 236-56.
II. Recent examples of this in the Christian sphere are Basil Mitchell's The Justification of Religious
Belief(London: Macmillan, 1973), and Richard Swinburne's trilogy: The Coherence ofTheism (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1977); The Existence ofGod (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979); Faith and Belief(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981). An older, but still in many ways unsurpassed attempt is J. H. Newman's
An Essay inAid ofa GrammarrifAssent (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979; first published London, 1870). The Indo-Tibetan Buddhist traditions are especially rich in systematic apologetical teds of this kind. The most famous example is probably Siintarak~ita's Tattvasangraha, translated
(together with Kamala~ma's pafijika) by GangaiiiithaJha, The Tattva Saiigraha with the Commentary of
Kamalasfla (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1985; first published Baroda, 1937-39).
12. A good example is 'Jigs med dbang po's Grub pa'i mtha'i mam bzhag rin po che'i phreng ba,
easily available in English translation. See H. V. Guenther, Buddhist Philosophy in Theory and
Practice (Berkeley: Shambhala Press, 1971), and Geshe Lhundup Sopa & Jeffrey Hopkins, Practice
and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism (London: Rider, 1976). The intellectual systems discussed in such
texts are abstract straw men, not real debating-partners.
13. See, for example, the works of Wilfred Cantwell Smith, notably Faith and Belief (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1979), and Towards a World Theology (Philadelphia: Westminster Press,
1981). On Smith, from very different perspectives, see David Burrell, "Faith and Religious Convictions: Studies in Comparative Epistemology," The Journal of Religion 63 (1983), pp. 64-73; William
J. Wainwright, "Wilfred Cantwell Smith on Belief," Religious Studies 20 (1984), pp. 353-66.
14. George A. Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1984).
15. The notion of an equivalence principle has been worked out with the greatest degree of sophistication by those adherents of the so-called Edinburgh School in which the strong program in sociology
of knowledge has been carried through with all the rigor that the position makes possible. See, inter
alia, Barry Barnes and David Bloor, "Relativism, Rationalism and the Sociology of Knowledge,"
in Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes, eds., Rationality and Relativism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982), pp.
21-47.

16. The Nature of Doctrine, p. 16.
17. The Nature of Doctrine, p. 16.

18. This is my terminology, not Lindbeck's. He usually speaks simply of "religious doctrines."
19. The Nature of Doctrine, pp. 33ff. Compare Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New
York: Basic Books, 1973), and Local Knowledge (New York: Basic Books, 1983), for some supportive
theoretical observations and some very illuminating case-studies.
20. The Nature of Doctrine, p. 33.
21. The Nature of Doctrine, p. 35.

22. George Lakoff's Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things (Chicago & London: University of Chicago
Press, 1987) is an important work that spans linguistics and cognitive theory, and, in its study of
concept-formation, provides direct support (if any is still thought to be needed) for Lindbeck's views
on what it is to become and remain a member of a religious community.
23. Lllldbeck does claim that the acceptance of a cultural-linguistic model brings with it the realization
that a particular religion's truth-claims are secondary to its "vocabulary of symbols and its syntax"
(The Nature of Doctrine, p. 35). But the kind of primacy at issue here is temporal rather than logical:
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the fact that one needs certain concepts before one can use them to make truth-claims says nothing
about whether the claims thus made are in fact true.
24. He actually distinguishes three. but since the third has to do with experiential-expressivism
(which, following Lindbeck, is to be rejected) I shall comment upon only two.

25. The Nature of Doctrine, p. 50.
26. The Nature of Doctrine, p. 19.
27. The Nature of Doctrine, pp. 63-69.
28. The Nature of Doctrine, p. 64.
29. The Nature of Doctrine, p. 64.
30. Suppose that I have a simple conceptual system: it contains the two propositions all four-year-olds
turn green on Thursdays and my four-year-old daughter does not turn green on Thursdays. The
second proposition is intrasystematically false; by Lindbeck's criteria it must therefore also be
ontologically false. If one could alter the ontological truth of any given proposition simply by altering
the conceptual system within which it is made, the world would be an even odder place than it
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31. I am indebted for this point to David Burrell. See also the comments below on performative
utterance.

32. The Nature of Doctrine, p. 65.
33. "For Christian theological purposes, that sentence [sc., "Christ is Lord"] becomes a first-order
proposition capable (so non-idealists would say) of making ontological truth claims only [my emphasis]
as it is used in the activities of adoration, proclamation, obedience, promise-hearing, and promise
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of Doctrine, p. 68.

34. The Nature of Doctrine, pp. 112-38.
35. J. L. Austin, "Performative Utterances," in idem, Philosophical Papers (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1961), pp. 220-39.
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Utterances," p. 224.

37. The Nature of Doctrine, pp. 113ff.
38. The Nature of Doctrine, pp. 12-13,137 n.7, 138 n.35. See Hans Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical
Narrative (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974).
39. I would not have sufficiently appreciated the importance of Lindbeck's use of Frei without the
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40. The Nature of Doctrine, pp. 120-21, citing David Kelsey, The Uses of Scripture in Recent
Theology (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1975), p. 48.
41. The Nature of Doctrine, pp. 128ff.
42. The Nature of Doctrine, p. 13I.
43. The Nature of Doctrine, p. 132.
44. Nowhere in his discussion of the possible modes in which dialogue among different religions
may occur (The Nature of Doctrine, pp. 52-55) does Lindbeck use the term "apologetics," not even
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45. Hick is prolific. Representative publications are: Truth and Dialogue: The Relationship Between
World Religions (London: Sheldon Press, 1974); "Whatever Path Men Choose is Mine," in John
Hick and Brian Hebblethwaite, eds., Christianity and Other Religions (London: Fount Paperbacks,
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salvation/liberation/fulfillment." "Religious Pluralism and Absolute Claims," p. 194.
47. See Hick, "On Conflicting Religious Truth-Claims," p. 488.
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(Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1984).
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non-Buddhist traditions. Buddhists, however, unlike Christians, generally do not need any convincing
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